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I. THE UNITED STATES'
INTERNATIONAL POLICY
Changes in United States policy in regard to international com-
mercial aviation represent the single most significant item of legal
impact during the past year. The United States trend toward deregu-
lation which started on the domestic scene with the Airline Deregula-
tion Act of 1978 has moved to the international arena. The close and
restrictive regulation of the international air transportation system is
fading against the trend toward deregulation and so-called "free mar-
ket place" economics.' Three factors stand out in this regard: (1) the
U.S. position in recent bi-lateral negotiations; (2) the restructuring of
the International Air Transport Association; and (3) the passage of the
International Air Competition Act of 1979.2 It is this third item
which may have the most far reaching consequences. President Car-
ter signed the International Air Competition Act into law on Feb-
ruary 15, 1980. Its stated purposes are to promote competition in
international air transportation and to establish goals for developing
United States international aviation negotiating policy.
Because of the significance to the air transport industry of the
new United States policy, it is appropriate to set out verbatim the
goals of the policy, which is now a part of section 1102 of the Federal
Aviation Act.
In formulating United States international air transportation
policy, the Congress intends that the Secretary of State, the Sec-
retary of Transportation, and the Civil Aeronautics Board shall de-
velop a negotiating policy which emphasizes the greatest degree of
competition that is compatible with a well-functioning international
air transportation system. This includes, among other things:
(1) the strengthening of the competitive position of United
States air carriers to at least assure equality with foreign air car-
riers, including the attainment of opportunities for United States
1. International Air Competition Act Sent to White House by Congress, 112,
No. 6 AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY 27 (1980).
2. Act of February 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-192.
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air carriers to maintain and increase their profitability, in foreign
air transportation;
(2) freedom of air carriers and foreign air carriers to offer fares
and rates which correspond with consumer demand;
(3) the fewest possible restrictions on charter air transporta-
tion;
(4) the maximum degree of multiple and permissive interna-
tional authority for United States air carriers so that they will be
able to respond quickly to shifts in market demand;
(5) the elimination of operational and marketing restrictions to
the greatest extent possible;
(6) the integration of domestic and international air transporta-
tion;
(7) an increase in the number of nonstop United States gate-
way cities;
(8) opportunities for carriers of foreign countries to increase
their access to United States points if exchanged for benefits of
similar magnitude for United States carriers or the traveling public
with permanent linkage between rights granted and rights given
away;
(9) the elimination of discrimination and unfair competitive
practices faced by United States airlines in foreign air transporta-
tion; including excessive landing and user fees, unreasonable
ground handling requirements, undue restrictions on operations,
prohibitions against change of gauge, and similar restrictive prac-
tices; and
(10) the promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics and a viable, privately owned United States air trans-
port industry.3
Several other aspects of this law should be noted. First, it con-
tains provisions designed to streamline the ability of the United
States to react to any perceived discriminatory practices against
American international carriers by a foreign government. Specifically,
after presidential review, the Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) can
suspend or revoke permits and rates of foreign carriers whose gov-
ernments place unreasonable restrictions on United States carriers.
The C.A.B. can also revoke or suspend a carrier's right to serve a
foreign city if the carrier has failed to provide any service to that city
for 90 days. Second, approval of international air service agreements
is prohibited in the event that they reduce or eliminate competition,
unless such an agreement is necessary for the public benefit, or for
the furtherance of United States foreign policy goals. United States
3. Id.
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negotiators, however, are allowed to trade the "Fly American" provi-
sion for a liberal, competitive bilateral air agreement with foreign
governments.4
Finally, on the subject of international fares, the C.A.B. must
establish a Standard Foreign Fare Level within 180 days after the
law's enactment. The Board is in the process of determining whether
the fares in effect on October 1, 1979, in twelve specific international
city-pairs markets are unjust or unreasonable. The Board allowed the
new Standard Foreign Fare Level (S.F.F.L.) to be set at 14.06%
above the October 1, 1979 level for transatlantic fares. Latin Ameri-
can fares were set 11.95% above and Pacific fares 12.2% above the
October level. Based upon interpretation of CCH Aviation Law Re-
ports,
The determination as to whether the international fares were
reasonable will be based on the existence of excess profits, using
the Board's traditional cost-based approach. If excess profits are
shown to exist in any of the 12 Latin American, Pacific, or North
American markets, the Board may establish a Standard Foreign
Fare Level different than the October first level. 5
There is a fare flexibility provision which prohibits the C.A.B.
from finding international fares unjust or unreasonable on the basis of
being too high or low if they are no more than 5% above, or 50%
below, a standard foreign fare level. This is comparable to the re-
quirements of the Airline Deregulation Act of domestic air carriers.
Moreover, in the event of different fare level findings the Board is
without authority to force a fare rollback, but rather the carrier can
maintain the existing fares until cost increases bring them into line
with fare levels determined by the Board to be just and reasonable. 6
Other minor changes relate to sabotage operations by foreign airlines
under specific emergency conditions. Another provision permits
foreign-registered aircraft to operate between U.S. cities under lease
to a United States air carrier (without foreign crew).
Where the new United States approach will lead is difficult to
say. Other recent United States efforts at liberalization have not met
with great success. At the recent International Civil Aviation Associa-
tion (I.C.A.O.) conference in Montreal, the United States' proposal to
consider the total removal of capacity restrictions was defeated by a
4. Supra, note 1.
5. Av. L. Rep. (CCH), No. 704, March 10, 1980.
6. id.
REPORT: AVIATION
substantial margin. Developments of the coming months will make a
review of this subject more definitive at next year's conference.
II. AIRPORTS
Problems of airport noise have also been among the more critical
legal developments in the United States. Legislation was signed into
law by President Carter, on February 18, 1980,7 establishing new
programs for dealing with airport noise. Of particular importance to
foreign air carriers is the requirement that the United States Secre-
tary of Transportation commence rule-making proceedings to require
aircraft used by foreign air carriers, as well as those of United States
carriers used in international operations, to comply with those stan-
dards of noise level imposed for domestic operations.
The law requires the Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.) to
regulate the noise emmission of foreign aircraft. In December, 1979
nine European countries (Belgium, Denmark, West Germany,
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom) agreed to make their aircraft comply with I.C.A.O. Annex
16 noise standards, which are similar to F.A.A. requirements. Pro-
posed rule-making for all foreign aircraft to comply with F.A.A. noise
standards are reported to be in final stages of preparation.
The legislation requires the United States Secretary of Transpor-
tation to establish a single system for measuring noise at airports and
surrounding areas; and to prepare and publish a noise exposure map
and a noise compatibility program for major airports. The law would
bar persons who buy property around airports to which an exposure
map has been submitted from recovering damages caused by aircraft
noise if such a person has "actual or constructive knowledge" of such
a map, unless the operation or layout of the airport changes signifi-
cantly. The information could not otherwise be used as evidence in a
suit seeking damages or other relief from aircraft noise.
In terms of airport noise litigation, two recent California cases
have caused concern among carriers and airport operators. Both ap-
pear to distinguish their situations from the earlier United States
Supreme Court case of City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal.8
In Greater Westchester Homeowners Association v. City of Los
Angeles, 9 the California Supreme Court in December 1979 affirmed
7. Act of February 18, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-193.
8. 411 U.S. 524 (1973).
9. 26 Cal. 30, 86 (Cal. 1979).
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a lower court ruling which permitted claims by homeowners who live
near the Los Angeles International Airport against the City of Los
Angeles, as airport proprietor, for mental and emotional distress
caused by the noise of airport operations.
Since issues of condemnation and inverse condemnation had
been fully resolved in earlier proceedings, the landowners' rights to
compensation for overflights of their land which amounted to a "tak-
ing" were no longer at issue. The court distinguished the Los Angeles
situation from earlier cases in the Federal Courts in which
municipalities attempting to assert local police powers to control air-
port noise were held to be pre-empted by the Federal Aviation Act,
The distinguishing characteristic in the court's opinion was that:
"While thus precluding local regulation of aircraft noise under the
police power, the Burbank court expressly refrained from imposing
similar limitations on the rights and obligations of a proprietor-
landlord to control aircraft noise levels."10 The court also made a
distinction between the injunctive suspension of the operation of a
public airport on the basis of nuisance which would come into conflict
with Federal pre-emption, and the right of the landowner to seek
compensation on a nuisance theory for personal injuries.
Of particular concern is the California court's ruling on the na-
ture of the alleged personal injuries of the plaintiffs. The court stated
in its findings of facts that:
[T]he noise created by jet aircraft using the two north runways ...
interfered with person-to-person conversation in the home ...
(with) normal telephonic communication . .. to hear and enjoy
television programs; that such noise caused frequent arousal from
sleep, and, in some cases, interfered with the ability . .. of school
age members of the families to study in their homes. 11
Such a finding might well apply to the use of certain runways at
nearly -all utilized airports throughout the United States. Substantial
recoveries on such a basis could have far reaching impact on landing
fees for all air carriers. The most extreme possibility would be a
homeowner sufficiently distant from the airport to avoid condemna-
tion but sufficiently disturbed, according to the above standard, to
10. Id. at 95.
11. Id. at 92.
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periodically sue for damages. It is anticipated that the City of Los
Angeles will petition the United States Supreme Court to review the
ruling by the California Supreme Court since it marks the first time
that damages have been awarded in California for emotional and men-
tal distress in an airport noise nuisance case.
The other California case involves the local airport authority's
right to regulate aircraft noise at the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Air-
port. 12 The specific defendant was Hughes Airwest in an action filed
by the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority in 1979, after
Airwest began expanding its flight schedules at the airport. This same
airport was the subject of the previously mentioned United States
Supreme Court case of City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal. 13
At that time the airport was owned by Lockheed, and a curfew on
nighttime jet operations had been imposed by the City of Burbank
under its police power. The Supreme Court declared the city ordi-
nance invalid on the grounds of federal pre-emption.
In 1979 the airport was sold to the public authority and the regu-
lation became proprietory in nature. The California Superior Court
ruled, on February 7, 1980, that the Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Air-
port Authority is not pre-empted by federal law from enforcing a reg-
ulation restricting airport noise. The court noted "there is no appel-
late agreement on the scope of the so-called proprietor's exception to
the federal pre-emption rule." 14 It ruled that "the federal govern-
ment has acquiesced and delegated to the Authority supervision of
the noise rule under the (federal grant) agreement and by virtue of
the environmental act."' 15 Airwest is appealing the ruling and the
court has allowed Airwest to maintain its current flight schedule for
120 days after a final judgment is rendered.
Because both of these cases appear to represent deviations from
earlier rulings they may both reach the United States Supreme Court
before a final decision is rendered. The enactment of the new Noise
Abatement Legislation, outlined above, may provide the Court with a
new dimension in reaching its conclusion.
12. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. Hughes Airwest, NCC-
17926-B (Cal.Super. Ct. 1980).
13. Supra, note 8.
14. Supra. note 12.
15 Id.
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III. SUITS BY AIRLINES AGAINST AIRCRAFT AND ENGINE
MANUFACTURERS 1 6
In a far-reaching decision of substantial importance in the field of
products liability law, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit has held that the doctrine of strict liability in tort,
under California law, is not available to a large airline in a suit against
the manufacturer of an aircraft engine for a defect in the engine that
caused property damage to the engine itself and to the aircraft on
which it was installed. 17 The court concluded that the policy reasons
given by the California state courts for the development of the doc-
trine of strict tort liability in favor of consumers did not apply where
the consumer was a large commercial entity. These policy reasons
were the risk distribution principle, the ability to inspect the product
for defects, the difficulty in proving a negligence case against a man-
ufacturer and the relative economic strength of the manufacturer and
the consumer.
The court noted that the Supreme Court of California had not
yet addressed the issue presented in the Scandanavian Airlines case
but nevertheless went on to reach the conclusion of "the issue which
that court would probably reach under the same facts."18
The court in this case held that SAS and United Aircraft were
financial equals. Somewhat peculiarly, the court also held that SAS
was not entitled to the benefits which supposedly poorer or less
affluent consumers would have, stating: "SAS can allocate its risk of
loss equally as well as United. Therefore, the societal interest in loss
shifting present in (other) cases is absent here." The court also said:
Although of less significance than the risk spreading rationale,
several other policies have been identified as underlying the doc-
trine of strict products liability in California. The consumer's diffi-
culty in inspecting for defects has impliedly been stated as a reason
for its application. Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App.2d 482, 53
Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966). Another policy concerns the difficulty a con-
sumer faces in trying to prove negligence. Cronin v. JBE Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162
(1972). In Daly, 20 Cal. 3d 725, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162,
the court stated:
16. The consideration of the Scandinavian Airlines v. United Aircraft case in part
III of this report and the KLM v. United Technologies case in part IV are based in
part upon the presentation of George N. Tompkins, Esq., of Condon & Forsyth, at
the I.S.T.A. Risk and Insurance Seminar, February 12, 1980, Salzburg, Austria.
17. Scandinavian Airlines System v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425 (9th Cir.
1979).
18. Id. at 427.
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We imposed strict liability against the manufacturers and in
favor of the user or consumer in order to relieve injured consumers
"from problems of proof inherent in pursuing negligence ...and
warranty . . . remedies .... ." [citations omitted] 19
In denying relief to SAS based upon the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity, the court reasoned:
Here, SAS had the expertise and personnel to inspect the en-
gines for defects. SAS does not have the lack of technical know-
ledge and expertise which would burden members of the general
public in proving negligence in designing or manufacturing the en-
gines. SAS does not face problems of privity as an artificial barrier
which the doctrine of strict liability seeks to avoid. Finally, the fact
that United will still be liable to airline passengers for any injuries
they receive as the result of defective United products will serve as
a significant deterrent from manufacturing unsafe products.20
Finally, the court said:
Interpreting these four requirements as the court did in Kaiser
leads us to the conclusion that SAS does not have a claim in strict
tort liability against United. SAS, United and McDonnell Douglas
dealt in a commercial setting from positions of relatively equal
economic strength. The specifications of the engines were
negotiated by the parties. Finally, McDonnell Douglas, United and
SAS all negotiated the risk of loss for defects in the engines.
We find, therefore, that the trial judge was correct in his in-
terpretation of California law and that the doctrine of strict liability
is not available to SAS in this case. 21
As to the effectiveness of the standard disclaimer clause in
purchase agreements which bars suits against aircraft and engine
manufacturers, there is presently pending a very important and what
should become a very significant decision from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The appeal was argued in
October, 1979 and involves litigation arising out of the Japan Air
Lines (JAL) DC-8 crash at Moscow in 1972. The trial court granted
summary judgment dismissing the complaint against McDonnell
Douglas on the basis of the disclaimer clause in the purchase agree-
ment between McDonnell Douglas and JAL.
22
19. Id. at 429.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d
936 (2d Cir. 1980).
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In an action recently tried against McDonnell Douglas iii the
Federal Court in Los Angeles, the court decided that the disclaimer
clause in the McDonnell Douglas agreement had been negotiated at
arms length and thus served to bar the action of the air carrier against
McDonnell Douglas. The court went further, however, and held that
a component manufacturer also came within the protection of the dis-
claimer clause in the McDonnell Douglas purchase agreement and,
accordingly, dismissed the complaint as to the component manufac-
turer as well.2
3
A hull suit brought by Varig Airlines in Seattle against the Boe-
ing Company and other parties similarly was dismissed upon the basis
of the disclaimer clause in the Boeing purchase agreement.2 4  After
dismissal of Boeing, the remainder of the case was remanded to the
federal trial court in Los Angeles from which it had previously been
transferred.25 The trial court there ruled that the disclaimer clause
in the Boeing sales agreement also extended to the component man-
ufacturer since he was a sub-contractor of Boeing who followed Boe-
ing's instructions and orders in the manufacturing of component parts
for the aircraft. The complaint as to the component manufacturer was
dismissed. Both decisions presently are the subject of appeals.
The various cases on appeal involving Boeing and Douglas dis-
claimer clauses involve the following issues: (1) whether the dis-
claimer clause bars a claim in strict tort liability; (2) whether the dis-
claimer clause bars liability for negligence occurring after delivery of
the aircraft, such as failure to warn of and take corrective measures
with respect to a dangerous condition which becomes apparent to the
manufacturer after delivery; (3) whether the disclaimer clause is voi-
ded where the aircraft does not meet the Detail Specifications set
forth in the purchase agreement in a relevant particular; (4) whether
the disclaimer clause bars negligence and strict tort liability claims
where the limited remedy of the warranty in the purchase agreement
fails in its essential purpose in view of the manufacturer's failure to
repair, replace or correct defects known to the manufacturer within
the warranty period but unknown to the airline; (5) whether the dis-
claimer clause bars claims based upon negligent misrepresentations in
the Detail Specifications for the aircraft; and (6) whether the standard
23. Airlift International, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., No. CV76-3401 (C.D.
Cal. 1979).
24. S.A. Empresa de Viacas Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines) v. Boeing Co.,
No. 76-169M (W.D. Wash. January 14, 1977).
25. Id. Decision After Retransfer, No. 76-0187 (C.D. Cal. February 8, 1979).
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disclaimer clause insofar as it may seek to bar claims based upon
strict liability in tort is contrary to the public policy of the manufac-
turer's state of domicile. It should be noted that some or all of these
issues will become moot if the SAS decision is followed in other
jurisdictions.
IV. CARRIER INSURANCE CLAIMS
In a suit by K.L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) against the Un-
ited Technologies Corporation, 26 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit ruled that the carrier had a valid "loss of use"
claim apart from a claim for the physical damage to the aircraft.
Moreover, proof of actual financial loss was not required since the
recovery is based upon loss of the right to use the aircraft, not the
level of proof which might have been realized.
The court stated:
It is his prerogative, as an incident of ownership, to gamble on
the use being productive. It is no answer then to say to the victim
of the tort: since you have failed to prove that you would have
made a net profit from use of the damaged property, you may take
nothing. For it is the right to use that marks the value. 27
The case involved substantial damage to an aircraft, under a ten
year lease to KLM, as the result of engine failure which caused the
aircraft to be out of service for 42 days. Repair costs had been re-
solved in negotiation so that the only issue before the court was loss of
use. The court held that rental value may provide a measure of loss of
use damages even though a substitute vehicle had not actually been
hired as was the situation in the KLM case. This ruling may have far
reaching impact upon aircraft out of service through provable fault of
the manufacturer.
V. WARSAW CONVENTION CASES
A. Passenger Cases
Several Warsaw cases of interest have been reported during the
past year. Perhaps the most interesting case was not American but
rather Canadian. In Ludecke v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd.,28 the
26. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschaapij (K. L.M. Royal Dutch Airlines) v. United
Technologies Corp., 610 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1979).
27. Id. at 1056.
28. 15 Av. Cas. 17,687 (CCH) (Can. S. Ct. 1979).
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Supreme Court of Canada chose not to follow the long line of United
States cases which have construed article 3(2) of the Convention to
require not only delivery of the ticket, but of one which, in accor-
dance with article 3(1), contains in legible form a statement that the
carriage is subject to the rules relating to liability established by the
Convention. The United States cases have considered that delivery of
a ticket not meeting such conditions amounts to no delivery, and
therefore the provisions of article 3(2), depriving the carrier of the
benefit of the limitation where a passenger is accepted without a tic-
ket, would apply.
The Canadian court pointed out that in most jurisdictions outside
of the United States the view is that: "Article 3 fails to provide any
sanction for its breach except in a case where a passenger has been
accepted with no ticket. Therefore a ticket bearing an illegible state-
ment or no statement at all would not result in a loss of the limitation
to the carrier." The court went on to hold that an air ticket bearing
an illegible statement concerning the applicability of the Warsaw
Convention and its liability limitation would not result in a loss of the
limitation to the air carrier in a death claim. The court did rule, how-
ever, that in baggage claims by carriers the Convention requires that
passengers receive a legible notice of the Convention and its terms
for an air carrier to avail itself of the Convention's protection.
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California in 1978 made the somewhat novel decision in In Re Air
Crash in Bali, Indonesia 29 to the effect that the California wrongful
death statute, which has no limitation on the amount recoverable,
was available to the survivors of passengers killed in an international
flight and they were not bound, as were the decendents, by the tre-
aty provisions as supplemented by the Montreal Agreement. A New
York state court in Lowe v. Trans World Airlines Inc. (TWA) 3 0 re-
jected this contention in regard to similar allegations by the legal rep-
resentatives of three passengers who were killed on a TWA flight
which crashed en route from Tel Aviv to New York.
In Metz v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines3 ' the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts in a November 1979 rul-
ing made an interesting distinction between an "accident" within the
meaning of article 17 of the Warsaw Convention and a heart attack
29. 462 F. Supp. 1114 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
30. 15 Av. Cas. 17,810 (CCH) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
31. 15 Av. Cas. 17,843 (CCH) (D. Mass. 1979).
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suffered by a passenger on an international flight. The court first cited
Benjamins v. British European Airways 32 wherein the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (New York) overruled its
previous position and found that article 17 created a substantive right
of action for recovery under the Convention, thereby avoiding the
need for showing jurisdiction founded in variable local law. The court
went on to find that the Benjamins holding does not necessarily pre-
vent the application of local causes of action outside the Convention;
it simply indicates the source of substantive rights and liabilities aris-
ing under the Convention. This ruling, in effect, allows the plaintiff
to proceed under any alternative local law theories which might be
available. Counsel for KLM advised the authors by telephone re-
cently that the case has not yet gone to trial on this issue.
B. Baggage and Cargo Cases
The failure to warn a passenger of the possibility of theft of
jewelry from checked baggage does not constitute willful misconduct
under article 25 of the Warsaw Convention. To establish willful mis-
conduct, the plaintiff passenger would be required to show that the
carrier: (1) was aware that there was jewelry in the baggage; (2) knew
that there was a danger that the jewelry would be stolen; and (3)
intentionally failed to warn the passenger that this danger of theft
would probably result in the loss of the jewelry. Inspection of bag-
gage made by government employees cannot be imputed to the air-
line as to knowledge of presence of jewelry. 33
For a passenger to establish willful misconduct for the theft of
jewelry from checked baggage, the carrier inust first be shown to
have been aware of the existence of the jewelry in the baggage at the
time the carrier assumed responsibility for it. In Danzigev v. Com-
pagnie Nationale Air France 3 4 the damages were computed upon the
basis on an assumed weight of one pound for the missing jewelry,
there being no evidence as to actual weight. Significantly, the court
awarded judgment for $9.07, the limit applicable to the weight of the
lost jewelry as contrasted with the weight of the checked baggage as a
whole.
A settlement by an air carrier with a plaintiff for the applicable
limits of liability (cargo case) precludes any claim for contribution or
32. 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1016 (1979).
33. Olshen v. El Al Israel Airlines, 15 Av. Cas. 17,463 (CCH) (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
34. No. 77 Civ. 1335-CSH (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 1979).
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indemnity against the air carrier by a co-defendant who may be held
liable to the plaintiff. Payment of the full extent of the carrier's possi-
ble liability under the Warsaw Convention bars any further contribu-
tion, whether direct or indirect, which would serve to exceed the
limit of liability 3 5
35. Swiss Bank Corporation v. First National City Bank, 15 Av. Cas. 11 17,631
(1979).
